This article discusses a chapter of the interwar history of the Ford Motor Company in Europe rather neglected by historians, namely its unsuccessful attempt to erect a solid base of operations in Italy. Expansion onto the Italian market had been part of the post-WWI Ford's strategy of internationalization. It seemed to go well beyond the exploitation of an additional demand as its most interesting and promising aspect was the utilization of the Italian branch as a bridgehead into the Balkans, the East Mediterranean region, the Middle East, and North-East Africa. At the beginning this strategy turned out successful. But when in the late 1920s the Company tried to strenghten its position in the country-either setting up its own assembly plant or establishing a joint venture with an C The
Introduction
In the late 1920s the Ford Motor Company tried two approaches to strengthen its position in the Italian market, either setting up its own assembly plant or establishing a joint venture with an Italian firm. Both were unsuccessful. This experience has not received much attention in the company's historiography. An accurate but synthetic account is offered in the 1964 volume on Ford abroad, 1 whereas the recent book on Ford in Europe devotes only three pages to Italy in the pre-World War II years.
2 This is not difficult to explain, for the Italian branch of Ford played a minor part in the company's multinational activity during the period. What attention it has attracted is due primarily to its political implications: namely, the juridical and institutional obstacles imposed by the fascist government to hinder Ford's expansion onto the Italian market. Conversely, Ford's Italian ventures have found fuller consideration in the historiography of the Italian automobile industry, in particular in company histories of the two firms that directly interacted with Ford during those years-Fiat and Isotta Fraschini. 3 Although in different ways, both were deeply involved in the economic policy of Mussolinis' fascist regime. Within the general history of the Ford Co., two key issues have emerged relative to its Italian interwar activity. First is its failure to penetrate the Italian market, which resulted in its post-1930 de facto withdrawal from the country. Before Ford's Japanese delusion of the late thirties, this was the company's only international interwar failure. Second, it represents the first time Ford considered merging with a foreign company to strengthen its position and in this case came very close to doing so. Ford's Italian experience thus turned out to be quite unique in the history of the company. However, this story is of interest for other reasons. The first is quantitative: this paper reconstructs primary economic data for Ford Italia, an aspect of the enterprise ignored in the historiography, 4 as if the ultimate failure of the company's Italian strategy had rendered the entire experience of scarce account. Attention is given primarily to the political-institutional context of the 1929/1930 economic reversal, which marked a change in the rather promising expectations and positive economic returns that had characterized the company's Italian operations in previous years. Second, it is valuable to reconsider the reasons for Ford's failure and its subsequent withdrawal from Italy. There is no question that the central reason was the strong opposition exerted by Giovanni Agnelli, the Fiat tycoon, who eventually was able to gain Mussolini's support in order to protect the Italian market. However, archival records show that on several occasions, Ford's top management appeared to be ambivalent; or, better, disinclined to press forward with plans to expand operations in the country, if this might lead to unexpected financial risk or challenge the company's authority. The most interesting example of this concerned a possible combination with Ford's fierce opponent, Fiat. The Ford men refused to accept the terms proposed by Fiat and the company therefore likely lost its last chance to set up a factory in Italy.
The article is organized as follows. Following this introduction, Sections 2 and 3 describe the general background of Ford's international activity and the Italian car market. Section 4 gives an overview of Ford's activity in Italy during the interwar period; Section 5 reconstructs quantitative economic data; Section 6 discusses the failure of Ford's attempt to erect an assembly factory in Italy; Section 7 addresses the "Fiat affair"; Section 8 focuses briefly on its last, unsuccessful attempt to establish a combination with Isotta Fraschini. The final section offers a few concluding comments.
The Background: Ford Abroad
Almost from the beginning of his enterprise, "Henry Ford wanted to sell his cars around the world."
5 Yet the process of building an effective multinational business organization was "prolonged and erratic" and, according to Steven Tolliday, was characterized by six chronological stages. The first three stages, occurring during the 4. Volpato complains that there are no figures available for the import of foreign cars into Italy by make before 1950. Yet statistical data for Ford exports to Italy can be reconstructed from a number of documents preserved in the Ford Archives at the Benson Ford Research Center in Dearborn (hereafter BFRC).
5. Tolliday, "The origins of Ford of Europe" in Ford., vol. I, 154. pre-World War II period, are of relevance here. Initially, before World War I, except for its U.K. operation, Ford exported directly to Europe. In the second phase, which developed in the 1920s, the expansion of overseas activity led to the opening of assembly plants abroad and of quasi-autonomous subsidiaries. In the third, beginning in the late twenties, Ford restructured all its European operations on a regional basis and turned over primary responsibility for production and administration to British Ford. But this ambitious project had to reckon with the protectionist and/or autarchic moves of many European governments.
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A few major steps marked these three stages. In 1911 Ford opened its first European assembly plant in Manchester, England, which by 1913 had become the largest car factory in Europe. This was followed by the Fordson tractor's wartime success. Britain's need for food-dependent on imports, cut off as British ships were attacked and sunk by its enemies-stimulated the production of crops internally. Mechanization was among the measures envisaged by the government to meet this challenge and Henry Ford's new cheap tractor represented an answer to the island's food problems. Large numbers of the tractors were shipped from Dearborn, and at the same time production began at a new plant in Cork, Ireland. 7 The British subsidiary was ably and successfully steered through the war by its English-born managing director, Sir Percival Perry. However, his ambitious postwar program for expansion in Britain and into continental Europe clashed with the views of Ford's American headquarters and Perry was dismissed.
In 1919 management developed a new plan for European operations and expansion, emphasizing tight control directly from Detroit. Dividing the continental market into six sales zones supplied by four assembly plants, the head office of the Foreign Department, moved to Copenhagen, oversaw all the continental branches, with the exception of Great Britain and France. American directors managed European branches, which had to "conform to Detroit practice in minute detail in regard to product, production and organization." 8 As a consequence, scant attention was paid to specific aspects of the European environment: market conditions, high taxation, and tastes required smaller, more economical cars than the United States produced. Henry Ford, however, quite pleased with sales in the U.S. market, remained committed to the Model T and sturdily refused to 6. Ibid., 153. See also Mira Wilkins, "Ford among multinational companies", in Ford, vol. I, 7. However as Wilkins and Hill maintain, "the role of the gasoline tractor in food production should not be exaggerated" (American business abroad, 73).
8. Tolliday, "The origins of Ford of Europe", 159.
offer new models. Therefore, starting in the early 1920s, sales began to decline in both Britain and continental Europe. Only in late 1927 was the new model A launched; yet even though it was sold in the European market with a smaller engine (the model AF), it remained quite a big car, designed for American tastes. 9 Things did not go well in the Cork tractor plant either. Once the war ended, British demand dropped. The plant also could not accommodate Dearborn's rhythms; costs and productivity were further affected by Irish-British sociopolitical tensions. Ultimately, Ford suspended production in 1922, not resuming until 1928. 10 It must also be noted that the 1919 reorganization plan itself was only partially successful. The partition of sales into six zones, the core of the plan, aimed more at exporting American cars than expanding production. In particular, the eastern Mediterranean region (the Adriatic division) was to be headquartered in Fiume (today's Rijeka). This location would have an immediate impact on Ford's operations in Italy, which were developing during the second stage of the company's internationalization process. However, events did not go as planned: instead of Fiume, divisional managers chose the seaport of Trieste, Fiume's historical rival on the northern Adriatic sea since the Habsburg period, as the site for company offices. Both cities, no more than one hundred kilometers apart, had been lost to the Austrian empire in World War I. But while the Versailles Treaty assigned Trieste to Italy, the fate of Fiume, claimed by both Italy and Yugoslavia, remained uncertain for a few years.
11 Therefore, Trieste appeared to be a much safer location for the Italian branch, even though until 1922 the port and its surrounding region were ruled only indirectly by the Italian Government through a General Commissioner.
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Given the lack of success of the 1919 plan, in autumn 1928 management approved a new plan for the general reorganization of Ford's European activities, bringing them under the control of a new English corporation, the Ford Motor Co. Ltd, with Perry recalled to take charge. According to this new plan, Ford of England would acquire 60 percent of the capital shares of the nine Ford companies active on the continent, 13 and 40 percent would be offered to investors 13. These branches were located in France, Denmark, Holland, Belgium Finland, Sweden, Italy, Spain, and Germany; see Wilkins and Hill, American Business Abroad, Appendix 2, 835. in each country to accommodate their national economic goals. Also, the boards of directors and management, especially middle management, at these nine companies were to be comprised primarily of citizens of each host county. Yet Perry, as president, and Charles Sorensen and Edsel Ford, as members of the board, would be important figures in each company.
14 Production was to be centralized in Dagenham, where an impressive new plant with an output capacity of about two hundred fifty thousand cars annually was under construction, while the activation of national assembly factories, which received parts in full-car sets, would assure a steady throughput. The British Headquarters gained a dominant position in European operations, occupying the same role previously held by Detroit vis-à-vis the continental branches. However, at least for a while, the primacy of the American system of production and its products would remain unchallenged, as shown by continuing manufacture of the Model A. Once more, however, the new plan was not successful, because of the Depression's devastating consequences for the car market and the subsequent general drive toward protectionism. If Dagenham's excess capacity was partly relieved by the introduction of a new smaller car (the Model Y), which turned out to be quite successful on the British market, heavy tariffs on importing knocked-down parts for on-site assembly made operations at the smaller plants more and more difficult. As we shall see, the Trieste factory was forced to end its activities.
The Background: The Italian Market
A few observations about the interwar market for automobiles within Italy can help frame the story of Ford's venture and hence our understanding of the main protagonists' behavior. First, throughout the entire period, Italian demand for vehicles was a fraction (between 1/6 and 1/10) of that in Britain and France, not to say the United States. This derived primarily from Italy's less developed economy, which experienced little growth during the fascist regime. Fascist propaganda about rapid motorization notwithstanding, many obstacles specific to the Italian market hampered car sales: the lack of adequate infrastructure such as paved roads and gas stations; the high price of fuel, affected both by the absolute lack of hydrocarbons in the peninsula and by fiscal pressure; 15 and, most important, the overwhelmingly high price of automobiles-which averaged, in terms of real wages, twelve times U.S. prices. The regime gave any attention only to the first problem, when it constructed about 500 kilometers of toll highways. On the other hand, for at least two decades, the statecreated oil agency (Agip, 1926) did not yield any benefit to consumers. A second constraint on sales is related to the effects of the 1929 stock market collapse. While it seemed that "as 1929 came to an end, prospects for the Ford business had never looked brighter" worldwide and that Ford sales for that year "nearly equalled the combined sales of all of GM's US products", 16 as we know, the ensuing depression heavily affected the market for vehicles. More specifically, it retarded implementation of Ford's development and reorganization plan for European activities, prepared at the company's British headquarters prior to the crisis. So Ford's growing disinterest in Italy post-1931 can be explained not only by the increased hostility of the Italian market, but also by the severe difficulties affecting the international economy and, on Ford's side, by the lack of effective marketing strategies visa-vis the European market.
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Yet, the very backwardness of the Italian market offered opportunities for growth unavailable in other industrialized countries. Optimism seemed warranted, especially during the years 1921-1926, a period in which the Italian economy, favoured by a quite liberal economic policy, was growing. During those years annual auto production within the country rose from fifteen thousand two hundred thirty to sixty-three thousand eight hundred units, a peak unsurpassed until 1937; in those five years, the number of vehicles in circulation almost tripled.
18 Given its eagerness to conquer foreign markets, Ford was willing to take advantage of this situation, as well as of a tariff that, while resisting import of finished units, didn't heavily penalize knocked down parts. Its move into the Italian market anticipated the entry of Citroen (1924) and Mercedes Benz (1925) . In addition, during the early 1920s the supply structure of the sector, characterized-with the exception of Fiat-by a number of small to medium sized firms, didn't seem to present any real barriers to entry. 19 Torino, Paravia, 1996, tab. II.7 and II.8. 19 . Quantitative data on the structure of the Italian industry are drawn from the database Imita.db (Archivio storico delle società per azioni italiane) in http://imitadb.unisi.it/home.asp. a substantial problem, probably underestimated by Ford's top management. After World War I, Fiat had concentrated its production into competitive automotive activities, built up the most modern automobile plant in Europe, Lingotto, which opened in 1923, and developed a first rate managerial cohort.
In my view, Ford's direct investment in Italy during the interwar period corresponded primarily to the second category of motives in the taxonomy outlined by J. H. Dunning, 20 i.e., market-seeking investment, which refers to initiatives established in a country after existing commercial relations have been hampered by tariffs or other obstacles. In addition, we will discover why and how Ford was forced to change its strategy, moving from a greenfield investment to improbable jointventure schemes. Unfortunately, this essay cannot contribute much to discussions about the function and practice of U.S. multinationals, for instance 'the transfer of national organizing principles of work' or the degree of Americanization affecting local practices. 21 Nor it can provide much empirical evidence to support the validity of the internalization theory of direct foreign investment, which explains the existence of multinational enterprises in terms of "some, possibly intangible, assets owned by these firms which compensate them for the higher costs implied by operating abroad. Trieste saw the heyday of Ford's interwar adventure in Italy. As a free port, the town could warehouse or tranship duty-free merchandise destined for countries other than Italy. Indeed, the market the Trieste branch was expected to supply was quite large:
In the [Trieste] plant, "semi-knocked-down" cars (chassis minus wheels, body and so forth) are assembled and stocked to fill orders from dealers in 34 different countries or dependencies. Cooper, a former military officer, 40 came to occupy very influential 36. The Ford Industrial Review described the Italian initiative similarly: "The Ford Motor Company d'Italia at Trieste is in many respects the most unique of the foreign Ford companies because it does business on three continents and crosses dozens of national boundaries in carrying out is program. Egypt, Crete, Greece, Cyprus, Palestine, Persia, and Rhodes are among the historic countries where the Ford sales and service sign is now a familiar sight and the picturesque camel is being supplanted by Ford cars. The work of translating Ford literature into widely differing languages spoken in the Trieste territory is almost a business in itself" (quoted in Volpato, 2002, "Ford in Italy", 452 During its early years, the Italian initiative seemed to progress satisfactorily: On July 8, 1924, Ford News enthusiastically headlined "Sales jump 149 per cent in a year, Ford Motor Company of Italy Record." The subhead in the same article observed: "Government orders fifteen Fordsons; tractor demand increased 321 percent over that of last year." By the mid-twenties it was even thought necessary to too hasty decisions, which, when further information is received necessitates his reversing his views and countermanding his original instructions. [. . .] We have also impressed upon him the necessity of handling some of the heads in a more diplomatic manner, as he has been inclined to take a high-handed attitude, which also was traceable to his Army experience." BFRC, Acc. 6: Report series, box 5, Report of J. J. Harrington to Edsel Ford, Paris, July 25, 1925, 5. 41. The evolution of Ford Italia's internal organization and management structure can be followed in AST, Tribunale commerciale e marittimo di Trieste, Registro RGB, IV, 22-23.
42. Ibid. 44. This information is all from the same minutes. See ibid., 3-5. enlarge the plant and upgrade the entire assembly operation; 45 such a move would turn out to be the most critical phase of Ford's entire interwar experience in Italy. In addition to total sales, gross revenues were also increasing. According to a confidential report of the Prefettura di Trieste, they had grown to 36 million Liras in 1923, 100 million Liras in 1924, 223 million in 1925, and 227 million in 1926. The company employed one hundred white-collar employees and from three to four hundred industrial workers.
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The Trieste plant, a large one-story building 665 feet long by 80 feet wide, was housed in the Hangar 27 in the free port zone. Its initial layout was designed for a daily output of twenty vehicles and ten tractors, including a storage space of about 5,000 square feet for both parts and finished products. 47 Still, clearly from the beginning, space was the critical issue. Already in November 1923 a new building had been rented in town (out of the free port) to host the Spare Parts Magazine.
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This move was expected to open up enough space to assemble seventy additional semi-knocked down units (thirty vehicles and forty tractors), but it was soon realized that storage problems persisted, allowing for assembly of a maximum of 55/60 units. 49 Therefore the search for additional space continued, with frustrating results. By the mid-twenties additional problems began to surface, largely arising from the continuous, creeping hostility of Italian car makers and tensions with the local institutions, which were trying to take advantage of their successful guest. In July 1925 J. J. Harrington visited Trieste and several places within the Mediterranean region where Ford was considering expanding. 50 In a report to Edsel Ford, he 45 . The good performance of the Italian branch was confirmed by a report dispatched by the Trieste police headquarters to the city's Prefect; and by this note forwarded to the Minister of the National Economy: "Its [Ford Italia's] technical performance is admirable, its workers are well regimented and well remunerated and in the factory the most rigorous discipline predominates," AST, Prefettura, Atti Generali, class. 5045, n. provv. 71, Informativa del Questore alla Prefettura della provincia di Trieste, prot. 50. In his letter Harrington seemed to point to Constantinople as a possible alternative/complement to the Trieste location, but we know that the initial choice outlined the critical issues affecting the market the Trieste branch served. First was the "necessity for arranging additional factory space, to ensure more efficient handling and distribution of present volume of business." Harrington reported several talks with the Port Authorities, who behaved very unsympathetically and whom he felt he could not trust. 51 51. Upon Harrington's arrival in Trieste, Thornhill Cooper had informed him that-because of congestion in the Port-Free port authorities had refused "to grant any additional space" and that Cooper had been offered property located in Mestre, in the environs of Venice. But instead of accepting it, he had had several talks with the authorities in Trieste. Cooper outlined the revenues derived from the company's shipping and activities that would be lost to the city if the company located elsewhere. The result was that the authorities conceded to lease another Hanger, no. 28, located alongside Hanger 27, which the company already occupied. But in exchange they requested payment of about one million Liras to erect another building to substitute for Hanger 28. Upon Ford's refusal, representatives of the Cosulich Line Co. in Trieste, the main shipping company of the Adriatic Sea, entered the discussion. They offered to assume the entire expense, provided that Ford Italia "would route all of [its] goods over their lines on a contract basis." Ford's reply was that "the more space secured, naturally the greater the volume of business that might possibly be cleared over their lines." Report of J. J. Harrington, 1-3. Documentation of this event can be found in AST, Prefettura, Gabinetto, busta 71, such as, f. e, Lettera riservata del Regio Commissario dei Magazzini Generali di the vehicle business, with the exception of sales to the Vatican and foreign Embassies. Thus, as "the Italian Company" had become "primarily a Tractor and Service organization," it had "to be remodelled accordingly." 67 The organization was cut "to skeleton proportions": the properties in Livorno (land), Genoa, Naples and Foggia were put up for sale; the number of employees was nearly halved (from 114 in 1933 to 58 in 1934). In short, all that remained of Ford's activity in Italy was the Bologna agency, which managed to survive until the war.
The Quantitative Dimension
Ford's experience in Italy during the interwar years can be compared to an asymmetrical curve with its vertex in 1929, followed by a rapid decline. Tractors in particular showed quite good results, reaching a maximum of 37 percent of total deliveries in 1926 (figure 1), possibly the result of the suspension of production at the Cork plant. The success of the Fordson can also be explained in part by the fact Ford enjoyed a near monopoly over the Italian market until 1928, when Fiat began steadily to encroach upon it.
69 Therefore Ford Italia could take advantage of the first wave of mechanization in Italian agriculture, which occurred precisely during those years: As for the company's economic performance, the 1922-1930 period was indeed profitable: at the end of 1930 Ford Italia had accumulated profits of about 56 million Lira. If one considers that the share capital of the company was just Lit. 500.000, the average yearly return on equity was extraordinarily high. In 1929, the only year for which we have detailed information, the return on assets of Ford Italia (13.9 percent) compared favourably to that of the main Italian manufacturers: Fiat (3, 3) , Alfa (3, 6) Ford, however, did not realize that the government's invitation presented an exceptional opportunity, to be acted upon immediately. As Cooper later explained to Mussolini, "in the year 1927, owing to the interruption of the production in the works at Detroit caused by the modification of our models, we had to suspend our activities." But when Ford tried to reopen discussions a year later, the moment had passed. On the one hand, in 1927 the Italian car market had gone through a considerable crisis ( to import parts and materials used in the manufacture of vehicles for export, or to the drawback on the duty paid on imported material.
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Any further increase of duties, encouraging retaliation, would have penalized Fiat exports, which amounted to about 75 percent of its production. Nonetheless, in spring 1929 Ford Italia submitted a proposal to erect an industrial plant in Italy, presented to the Duce on June 5th at a special meeting in which the Minister of the National economy, Alessandro Martelli, and a delegation from Trieste also participated. 85 84. The government proposed additional measures, which aroused the concern of the Royal Automobile club, as they could eventually weaken the Italian industry: for instance, it was suggested that municipal authorities not license taxi services using foreign cars; and that advertisements of vehicles of foreign manufacturers be prohibited on semi-official periodicals such those published by the Touring Club or the Automobile Club. ACS, PCM, Gab, Rub. 2, fasc. The new plant, to be located in Trieste, was "intended to cover Italian consumption and consumption of those countries, which naturally depend on Trieste, such as Central Europe and, probably, the Near East." Construction would undertaken by a Company in which 40 percent of its capital and a portion of its directors would be Italian. This condition was in line with the general re-organization plan Perry had proposed for the European subsidiaries. The factory would daily complete about 50 vehicles. Production materials would be purchased "in the largest possible volume" in Italy; these included "tyres, fan belts, rubber blocks used as engine supports, etc. etc., particularly material used for bodies and upholstery. The proportion of Italian material to be used in the manufacture of motor cars . . . [would have] gradually increased." The greater the capacity of the Italian plant, the greater would be its ability to absorb Italian parts.
However, Ford's sine qua non for carrying out this program was that the Italian Government concede to Ford Italia the same license it had given to Italian car makers for the temporary import of foreign parts and material. The proposal's final comments explained how various sectors of Trieste's economy would gain from this plan: first, the shipping sphere, "through transportation of material imported from the States and the finished goods re-exported"; second, the port, "through harbour workmen being employed for unloading and uploading operations and through the profits which would result to the Magazzini Generali"; third, the industrial sphere, "through the manufacturing activities of the Company at Trieste, entailing the employment of a great deal of local workmen in their factory." 86 According to another source, the project could employ as many as five hundred to six hundred workers. 87 To be sure, the memorandum concluded with a veiled threat, which unfortunately would later become reality: The government's position led Ford to limit its Italian operations to the construction of a factory whose output would be sold primarily within the Italian Kingdom. Thanks to the new Model A, it rather optimistically expected to reach a target of ten to twelve thousand sales annually within a few years. 90 Plans for the Near East were also modified, "allotting to other plants already existing or to be laid down in other states, the territory which had been previously destined" to Trieste. 91 At the same time the company launched a search for a new location, which resulted in the selection of Livorno. In this way Trieste's fate was sealed. Once its main advantage as the gateway to the Orient was no longer valued, its attractiveness vaporized. Having decided to move the plant to Livorno, the company quickly purchased roughly 57,000 square feet of land in the city's industrial zone. The Italian authorities were informed almost immediately, and within a few days Cooper, at the urgings of the Secretary to the Prime Minister, Francesco Giunta, proceeded to Rome, to be introduced to Mussolini. After Cooper, in response to the Head of the Government's inquiries, explained why Trieste had been abandoned, Mussolini stated that while Ford Italia had acted "perfectly correct[ly]," he wanted to think the matter over and so invited Cooper to another meeting two days later, on September 24. At that meeting, which was attended by Mussolini and Giunta as well as other major figures in the regime, 92 Cooper concisely explained recent develop- Two new issues resulted from that meeting, both deeply affecting the context within which Ford had to operate. First, Mussolini favoured the Trieste option, both because the recently annexed town had become a sort of patriotic symbol of the regime and because Ford's location there would have secured some export business for Italy. Second, Fiat's interests had at last been officially recognized.
The storm was approaching, fostered by the behaviour of the Government. The next day Cooper had an interview with Hon. Gino Olivetti, the President of the Confederation of Industries and also elected Deputy from Turin, who pointed out that "a Ford factory in Italy could severely handicap the activities of the Fiat, inasmuch [as . . . ] Ford would have been exempted from taxes for 10 years [and] , furthermore, could have imported automobile parts at a cost much inferior to that paid by the Fiat for similar parts." Therefore, Olivetti concluded, the new factory should manufacture all the parts needed for the final product in Italy. That same morning Cooper met with Senator Agnelli (Fiat) and communicated the Duce's desires. Agnelli replied that "no collaboration was possible." Later that day Agnelli explained to Mussolini that it would be impossible "to sustain the competition which a Ford factory would create on account of the especially favourable conditions granted by the Industrial Zone." Mussolini then changed his mind: on September 29 he presented the Council of Ministers a new law, based on the principle of safeguarding national defence. The next day Secretary Giunta told Cooper that:
For the purpose of national defence the Government will classify as 'fundamental' such factories which manufacture in the Kingdom of Italy such products that interest the defence of the State. Such factories must be organized and equipped in such a manner that they are able to complete all the integral stages in the manufacture of their completed products. Later regulations will be issued determining which factories will be considered 'fundamental', but it is evident [. . .] that in such regulations, automobile factories will be included.
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There was a fundamental problem, however, with the new law: no Italian car maker could manufacture all the parts required to build a vehicle. Therefore, the law's application had to wait for a thorough investigation by Confindustria, the Italian employers' federation, to ascertain what auto parts could be considered outside "the integral stages" of production and hence imported.
95. Ibid., 3.
Fiat's strategy emerges clearly from this account. Immediately after he was informed of Ford Italia's plan to emphasize production for the Italian market, Agnelli appealed for protection from the government with all the power at his disposal. He argued that the new Ford plant would seriously threaten Fiat's very survival; and, backed by Confindustria, claimed that granting the benefits Ford had requested could weaken the national defense in case of war. The authorities' contradictory behaviour puzzled Ford's management. Despite Mussolini's and Agnelli's actions, Secretary Giunta led Cooper to understand that Ford could still construct a factory in Italy, equipping it in part by importing materials allowed during the grace period before implementation of the new law, in part by exploiting national production. Because the engine had been the critical element in previous discussions, special attention was to be given to the possibility of manufacturing it in Italy.
96 Also, it was not clear at this point where the plant was to be built: quite a sum of money had been spent for the Livorno property, but Mussolini had expressed his preference for Trieste. Perry wisely suggested that Ford "lie low," hoping that it might "result in bringing the Italian Government somewhat to [its] senses." In the meanwhile he proposed to increase the already valuable tractor business.
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It was quite a surprise, therefore, to find in the archives a letter from Cooper to Mussolini, dated October 22, in which he respectfully asked the Duce "to consider our request to be relieved of our contract at Livorno and to be reimbursed with the funds that were expended there by our Company in complete observance of the laws then existent."
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Giving up on the new site meant that the location had reverted to Trieste. Of course Cooper's request was never fulfilled and it was some time before Ford Italia was able to sell its property on the west coast. But what matters here is Mussolini's reaction.
On October 26 he cabled the Trieste Prefect, Ettore Porro, with an order to communicate to Cooper that a new law, giving the Minister of the Guilds the power to authorize establishing new foreign companies, was being registered. Mussolini went on to say that personally "he had made the decision of refusing such authorization to the Ford Co, because such authorization would have call[ed] for similar authorizations for other competing makes such as General Motors." This 96. According to the Report "The motor was the 'main bone of contention' on which we lost our case in the last negotiations with the Government, as they felt that in case of war our factory would be useless to them, if we continued to import motors from abroad." Ibid. 4.
97. Perry's Report to Ford, October 11, 1929, 2-3. 98 . ACS, Segreteria Particolare del Duce, Carteggio Ordinario, busta 308, fasc. 100/971, Trieste, Soc. Ford d'Italia: Cooper a S. E. Mussolini, Trieste 22 ott. 1929. in turn would have provoked "an internal dumping which would have irremediably compromised the Italian automobile industry." Mussolini concluded by stating that his decision was not to be interpreted as "an hostile act towards the Ford Co and her founder, of whose capacity and personality" he remained a sincere admirer.
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On the same evening an alarmed Porro cabled back to Mussolini that Cooper was asking for an official statement to forward to London. He conjectured that the Trieste branch had already been closed and its one hundred thirty employees dismissed. 100 However, the new law, issued on November 18, 1929, would remain inoperative until publication of the list of the basic industries it was intended to protect, which eventually occurred the following July.
101 This delay, as seen in the case of Giunta's unofficial proposal Governo, 26.10.1929, ore 23,30 . Without consulting the Ford records, on the basis of just these two cables, Castronovo erroneously concluded that Mussolini's message meant the forced closing of the Trieste plant for a "problem of national order." Castronovo, Fiat 1899 Fiat -1999 . Incidentally, on that same day, a letter from Agnelli left Turin for Rome: he warmly thanked the Duce and complimented him on his decision, "inspired by the sentiment of justice and political wisdom that always had driven His behaviour in regard to the national industry." 101. R.D. 1455 of July 18, 1930. 102. Perry's Report to E. Ford, February 10, 1930, 3. 103. Ibidem. Previously, duties on automobiles imports amounted to 35 percent ad valorem and 65 Gold Lire per 100 kilos, while those on tractors and automobile and tractor parts were 60 Gold Lire per 100 kilos. The new tariff charged 30 percent ad valorem on automobile and tractor parts.
104. Progetto Archivio Storico Fiat, Fiat 1915 -1939 -Verbali del consiglio di amministrazione, vol. II: 1923 /1930 , Milano, Fabbri Editore, 1092 (Seduta del 21 novembre 1929 .
105. ACS, PCM, Gab. Rub. 2, fasc. 3/1-7, 6610: Telegramma di Giovani Agnelli a Mussolini, 6.3.193 .0.
The Fiat "Affair"
At this point, if Ford managers wanted to implement their plans for Italy, they had to devise a new strategy. Perry still believed that there was "a very big potential market in Italy."
106 However, to get to this market, it was necessary to reckon with the peculiarities of the Italian context and operate on the political-diplomatic level. Asking "Why are the Italian Government and . . . Mussolini concerning themselves so intimately with matters which are, after all, comparatively insignificant?", 107 Perry realized he had to find a way to circumvent the connection between politics and economics that strangled free competition. "These Italians play politics too much with business!" 108 he eventually blurted out in frustration. But for the time being, a possible strategy was to develop an agreement with an Italian company to manufacture as many parts as possible within the country. Given that Fiat had "ridiculed" Cooper's proposed agreement, even if suggested by the Duce, Ford Italia had to search for an alternative partner. The choice was Isotta Fraschini, "the second most powerful motor group in Italy" and apparently well supported politically. By the late twenties it had become a major producer of aircraft engines, primarily for the military, and submarines, as well as a significant force in auto production. Before World War I, the company had gained an international reputation for its luxury cars; after the war, however, car output had declined to a few units per year. From a technical point of view the choice appeared to be a good one: Isotta had a large plant in Milan, Italy's industrial center, where it employed about four thousand workmen. Even more important, the firm seemed to have been planning for years to open production of a new line of medium-sized cars. 109 In addition, it controlled a significant share of the Breda Company, one of the major metal working factories in Italy. Yet from an economic and financial point of view, Isotta was a much less felicitous choice, for two reasons: First, by the late 1920s it was almost totally dependent on orders from both the Italian and foreign governments and hence considerably exposed to shifting political circumstances. This meant also that payment was usually spread over several years, a particularly risky situation in a period of economic turmoil such as that between the wars. Second, for years the company had been administered imprudently by two unscrupulous managers, the president, 106. Perry's report to E. Ford, February 10, 1930 , 7. 107. Ibid., 6. 108. BFRC, Acc. 38, C. Sorensen Papers, box 7, Italy 1931 , Perry to Russell, (February 13, 1931 .
109. In 1926 Isotta had also tried to gain the control of Alfa Romeo. Bigazzi, Il Portello, 610. Count Mazzotti Biancinelli, and the managing director, commendatore Gian Riccardo Cella. Nonetheless, according to the 1929 financial statement presented to Cooper, the company apparently was in fair economic condition. It had registered profits of almost 10 million Lire, yielding shareholders a 10 percent dividend, which was entirely in line with figures for the previous years. However, a few critical numbers had been deftly exaggerated to hide a quite difficult situation.
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Cella immediately realized that an agreement with Ford was an extraordinary opportunity to get Isotta out of its financial troubles. As early as January 1930, he forwarded Perry a detailed proposal for a five-year alliance that would allow the Italian company to manufacture twelve thousand five hundred cars a year, under Ford's control, in a new plant erected for this purpose.
Perry seemed personally inclined to accept the proposal, because he thought that working with Isotta was the only way to develop steady inroads into the Italian market. . .] agree with me that the proposal should receive very serious consideration and, subject to certain reservations, recommend that it should be proceeded with and consummated if possible. The reasons for recommending it are that we believe that it will be, for some years at least, impossible to establish ourselves in Italy except along these or similar lines." Perry's Report to E. Ford, February 10, 1930 , 7. 112. BFRC, Acc. 38, C. Sorensen Papers, box 4, Italy 1930 , Perry to Sorensen, February 10, 1930 ; see also Idem, Perry to E. Ford, February 10, 1930. 113. The financial side of the proposal was as follows: (i) Ford would purchase from Cella and Mazzotti 100,000 shares at a price of 230 Lire per share; Isotta's shares were quoted on the capital market at about 205 Lire, the difference of 25 Lire being the price of acquiring such a significant block of company shares; (ii) Isotta would take shares in Ford Italia worth up to 10,000,000 Lire; (iii) Ford would subscribe to 60 percent of a future issue of Isotta shares, in order to procure additional working capital to finance the erection of a new factory. Overall, Ford would have eventually disbursed about 60 million Lire. Idem, Isotta Fraschini, Draft Agreement to be submitted to Mr. Perry, January 21, 1930 . 114. Idem, Sorensen's Cable to Perry, March 13, 1930 Somewhat unwillingly, Perry wrote Cella that the American headquarters had rejected the proposed intercompany financial arrangements but was still ready to discuss its commercial aspects. He knew that Isotta was short of capital and hence realized that the manufacturing component of the proposal could hardly be arranged without accompanying financial arrangements.
115 Nonetheless, contacts between the two companies-namely, between Perry and Cella-were never interrupted and these would lead to a new preliminary agreement. Meanwhile, an old acquaintance broke into negotiations: Fiat.
It had taken almost a month for Ford and Sorensen to reply to the Isotta proposal. This was quite untypical, considering that the exchange of messages within Ford's top management was usually very speedy-a reply following almost immediately upon receipt of an original message and so forth. Perry appeared unhappy about this turn of events. He replied to Sorensen that "undoubtedly Fiat knew [of Isotta's] proposals" and hence was "trying to embarrass us because we obviously could not be talking to both lots of people at the same time." For Perry, the entire question risked becoming deeply political: "Mussolini is probably most desirous of strengthening up a second group of motor and engineering interests in Italy, in order to play them off against Fiat." 119 In fact, the "Isotta people" could count on the support of quite a strong political lobby within the fascist regime, headed by Costanzo Ciano, father-in-law of the duce's daughter. Perry left the entire matter 115. Idem, Perry to Cella, March 17, 1930. 116 . Several documents concerning the feasibility of direct talks between the two parties can be found in BFRC, Accession 572, Nevins and Hill Research, Box 17, File 11.14, Foreign Agencies and Plants-Italy, 1930. 117. "Dear Charlie, the Fiat people are planning to come to Detroit and, of course, are anxious to see you." BFRC, Acc. 38, C. Sorensen Papers, box 4, Italy 1930, The President of the National City Bank to Sorensen, January 8, 1930. 118. Idem, Perry to Sorensen, March 17 and 25, 1930; Sorensen to Perry, April 3, 1930. 119. Perry to Sorensen, March 17, 1930. 123 even more surprisingly, the original document has not been found in the Italian archives. The document, hastily written, was divided into two parts, the first addressing commercial matters, the second, financial. The terms of the agreement were roughly as follows:
1. Fiat would sever from its organization those branches of manufacture not corresponding to Ford-style automobile production: remaining activities would be given to a new company, Fiat Works. 2. The value of that portion of Fiat capital stock that would be "assigned to the activities concerned with the production of motor cars and kindred work" was estimated at three-fourths of the total value, viz. 300 million Lira, subdivided into one hundred fifty thousand shares nominally valued at Lit. Sorensen responded negatively to Fiat's proposal almost immediately. On July 7, he communicated directly to Agnelli:
With regard to our discussion and your memorandum relative to a possible fusion of our interests in Italy, we regret to state that we feel we should not be justified in doing anything which would have the effect of excluding competition. Mr Ford believes that the benefits of cheap and efficient automobiles are essential to progress and can only be obtained by fostering competition, whereas your proposals, which includes the elimination of certain models, would have the opposite effect and we believe this would be to detriment of Italy and Italian nationals.
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According to a note Sorenson subsequently wrote to Perry's secretary, in which he requested a copy of the full Fiat document, the above "letter was a reply to a brief that Senator Agnelli dictated to us, in which he gave us a proposal of how to make a joint company with us." 126 Despite the scarcity of documentation, it is possible to hypothesize how things proceeded. During Sorensen's visit to Turin, Fiat's Agnelli set forward the main points of his proposal and forwarded a draft to Sorensen the following day. "Mr. Ford" (almost certainly Edsel, to whom Sorensen directly passed on the draft) was probably consulted by telephone over the weekend and on Monday Sorenson mailed the above letter to Agnelli.
Was the issue of competition a pretext to reject the proposal? No hint of the "elimination of certain models" can be found in the memorandum, unless one interprets predetermination of the models to be The exchange of messages that very rapidly concluded this story raises doubts about the motives underlying both parties' approach to the would-be agreement. Both seem to have been driven more by political expediency-the desire to please the Duce-than by a sincere desire to work out an agreement. Ex post the Fiat avance can be seen as a bluff, a way of diverting Ford from its negotiation with Isotta Fraschini; nor it should be forgotten that coupes de theatre similar to the one Agnelli proposed to Sorensen during his visit to Turin were not new to the Senator, but rather were one of his tactics for surprising an adversary. Ford's behavior, in turn, can be seen as a conscious move to call Agnelli's bluff. Still, one cannot but wonder what would have happened if the counterfactual hypothesis had worked out, that is, if one of the two parties had accepted the other's offer.
The Last Attempt
On the same day that Sorensen wrote to Agnelli (July 7), Isotta Fraschini renewed its proposed agreement; again it rested in Perry's hands. Perry wrote Edsel Ford that he and Sorensen judged that it was "in the best interests of Ford's business in Italy . . . [to] conclude a working agreement with them." He enclosed a "semi-legal document" he had personally drafted, titled "Heads of Agreement," which restated most of the January memorandum and included a partially revised with Italy asking for favorable conditions for her pecorino (ship milk cheese) and at best with no positive result before lengthy talks. Therefore, the only way forward appeared to be a prompt agreement with Isotta. Thus, the two parties signed a preliminary memorandum on August 20. Yet they had to wait for the Government's approval, as required by the two aforementioned decrees about the establishment and/or enlargement of factories producing materials essential to National Defense. And this was late in coming. Several reasons account for the delay. The first was, once again, political. Mussolini kept hesitating because he feared Fiat's reaction if he approved the agreement. On September 16, the Minister for Internal Affairs received a restricted cable from the Turin Prefect, reporting that "top secret investigations" indicated demonstrations against the Government by Italian car manufacturers were imminent because of the "proximate conclusion of the agreement between the American Ford Company and the Isotta Fraschini firm." 134 Additionally, Mussolini was suspicious of the political lobby supporting the Milanese firm. In the end, political considerations were intertwined with economic ones: the world economic crisis was severely affecting demand for vehicles in the country and the entry of thousands of new cars on the market could have dramatic consequences on internal production. 135 Therefore, while the Americans were eager to move forward ["We have a layout and plan ready" Sorensen telegraphed to Perry 136 on
October 22], the Italians were not. Scott, general manager of the Trieste plant, had been in Rome twice to discuss matters with the new Minister of the Guilds, Giuseppe Bottai, who argued that, "in view of the present temporary economic conditions as they affect the automobile industry and the employment problem," Ford should limit the sale of cars and trucks during the first year of production. It is very regrettable, indeed, that so much time and energy has been wasted in this manner and that your own valuable and persistent effort has not been able to achieve the result desired.
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Cooper was responding to Perry's directive; as Perry reported to Sorensen: "I told Cooper that we did not wish to waste any more time on the subject and therefore to write to Cella and make this decision clear." 145 The decision withstood further desperate pleas by Cella, whose fortunes continued to decline.
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Conclusions
This essay has shown that, contrary to the ex post facto evaluations of Ford's managers and despite current historiography, the American company's interwar Italian adventure was quite complex and worthy of more careful analysis, not least because of the sheer scale of its operations in the early years: deliveries from Ford's Italian plant during the 1922-1929 period were not inconsiderable. At that time, Ford sold Trieste-produced tractors in both European and Middle East markets and in Italy. Vehicle sales were less numerous because Ford had to reckon with both the limits of the Italian market and Fiat's dominant position within it. Even so, Ford's European managers were confident about the Italian car market's growth potential. Therefore, they tried repeatedly to secure their position in the country. In doing so they had to struggle with both worsening international economic conditions and an increasingly hostile political environment; these factors led to Ford's eventual withdrawal from the country. To date, the historiography has focused exclusively on the obstacles presented by the Italians, i.e., the political and economic barriers to entry erected by the fascist regime, urged by the powerful Fiat lobby. From this perspective Ford's experience in Italy supports the Gerschenkron thesis about the crucial role the state plays in supporting private business in latecomer countries. 147 Certainly, policy was a decisive factor in this story: moreover, it required a kind of political expertise "Italian style" that Ford managers were unused to and, in any case, was quite different from typical business strategies. Yet this study has shown that on three occasions Ford hesitated and even hung back from acting; First, when the company was slow to accept the government's invitation to establish a "Detroit model" factory; second, when it rejected the financial part of Isotta-Franchini's first offer; and third, when the Fiat proposal was deemed too constraining. Of the three opportunities, the first probably could have been the most promising, if it had been acted upon immediately, insofar as it occurred within favorable, most likely unique, "environmental" circumstances, that is, Mussolini's desire to teach Fiat a lesson. The second implied a financial commitment that was not in alignment with Ford's typical practice. Accepting Isotta's terms might have been a risk, mainly because the Italian company was badly managed; but the economic power of the American company could possibly have overcome its financial weakness. The third was the most dramatic and may have been more of a ballon d'essai than a sincere attempt to retain Ford in Italy. And yet what would have happened had Ford accepted Fiat's offer, provided no further government meddling occurred? Who would have gained more from an agreement with Fiat? Certainly Fiat's throughput would have increased considerably; and Ford would have finally achieved its ambitions in Italy. Yet both would have had to cede some power. Nor was it clear who would have final decision-making railroad men to pay attention to their concerns. In the end, the case of La Crosse suggests that historians need to pay much greater mind to people and governments in small, hinterland cities before they can fully grasp the rich history of railroading, and of capitalism more generally, in the nineteenth-century Middle West.
Perhaps more than anyone else in La Crosse, Wisconsin, a bustling frontier city on the banks of the Mississippi River, Thomas Benton Stoddard recognized the intrinsic overlap between the worlds of government and railroads in the nineteenth-century Middle West. Stoddard had long navigated both worlds. On the one hand, he had been born into politics in 1800. Stoddard's father, Richard, had served as the first sheriff of Genesee County, New York, and been a leading member of the Federalists, an influential political party devoted to the idea of greater federal intervention in the American economy, in the western part of the Empire State.
1 As a young man, Thomas honed his political skills when he lived among the Seneca Indians, learned their language and culture, and helped the tribe negotiate its claims with federal agents. Moreover, after he arrived in southwestern Wisconsin in 1851, he worked with state politicians to organize La Crosse County. In 1856, grateful voters of the new city of La Crosse elected him mayor. Stoddard was thus more than a little familiar with the often-ticklish ways of federal, state, and local government in nineteenth-century America. On the other hand, he was well versed in the mind-boggling intricacies of western railroading. In 1864, he won land concessions from Minnesota legislators, and convinced local city council members to invest public money in his railroad company, the Southern Minnesota. As a result, on November 18, 1870, gleeful La Crossers welcomed the railroad home. 2 Ultimately, the Southern Minnesota helped link La Crosse to an emerging regional railroad network, which eventually transformed the city into a hub of western commerce in the second half of the century. Historians typically describe the efforts of Stoddard and other Midwestern railroad boosters in small cities as a tale of high hopes but ultimately broken dreams. 3 Beginning at mid-century, as this conventional narrative goes, Midwesterners like Stoddard recognized that
